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Government Intervention Entrenching Corporate Power: Historical and Contemporary Evidence

Introduction: State Power as a Protective Alliance for Big Business

Conventional wisdom holds that governments act as neutral referees or watchdogs over big corporations. In reality, many historical and modern cases show the opposite – state intervention frequently bolsters the market dominance of large firms rather than restraining it. Revisionist historians have documented that business and government often operated in tandem. For example, during America’s Progressive Era, there was “no sharp dichotomy or antagonism between big businessmen and the Progressive Movement’s thrust for regulation”; indeed, leading industrialists understood that new regulations were “not to fight the growth of ‘monopoly’ and centralization, but to foster it”1. In practice, tools like subsidies, bailouts, favorable regulations, and licensing requirements have repeatedly entrenched incumbent firms – insulating them from competition and often suppressing smaller rivals. This report presents evidence across eras and sectors that the state–corporate relationship often functions as a protective alliance rather than a check-and-balance system.

Historical Precedent: Railroads and the Rise of Statist Regulation

One of the clearest historical examples comes from the 19th-century U.S. railroad industry. Far from opposing government intervention, railroad barons actively lobbied for it when market competition eroded their profits. In the late 1800s, cutthroat competition in rail shipping drove freight rates down sharply (rates fell 20% nationally from 1882–1886 alone)2. Railroad executives found that voluntary cartels and rate-setting agreements (railroad “pools”) kept breaking apart as individual lines undercut each other34. By 1879, there was “a general unanimity among [railroad] pool executives… that without government sanctions, the railroads would never maintain or stabilize rates”5. In other words, industry leaders concluded that only state-enforced coordination could rescue them from “ruinous” competition.

As historian Gabriel Kolko documented, “when these efforts failed… the railroad men turned to political solutions to stabilize their increasingly chaotic industry”, pushing measures to rein in rival railroads that refused to honor gentlemen’s agreements6. Most railroad magnates “rejected… laissez-faire” and came to embrace a “Hamiltonian” view of active national government in their sector6. The result was the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, creating the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) as the first federal regulator. Far from being imposed on an unwilling industry, this regulation was urged by the railroads themselves. An ICC poll in 1892 found that 14 out of 15 major railroads “favored legalized pooling under Commission control.” One executive bluntly declared that “railroad men had had enough of competition… ‘free competition’… regulates by the knife.”7. In 1906, the Hepburn Act expanded the ICC’s rate-setting powers with strong backing from railroad tycoons – Pennsylvania Railroad president A. J. Cassatt “spoke out as a major proponent” of the Act, steel baron Andrew Carnegie endorsed it, and J.P. Morgan’s associates applauded that it would be “for the ultimate and great good of the railroad.”8. In sum, railway monopolies used federal power to stabilize prices and curb upstart competitors under the banner of “public interest” regulation.

The railroads were not unique. Across the Gilded Age and Progressive Era, big business repeatedly turned to the State to secure what it couldn’t obtain in free markets. Overextended giants in industries from steel to oil to meatpacking saw smaller competitors nipping at their heels around 1900, undermining cartel schemes and driving down prices910. U.S. Steel, for instance, was formed by the merger of many steel companies in 1901, yet within a few years its profit margins collapsed over 50% as its bloated, conservative organization lost market share; having failed to dominate through size alone, U.S. Steel “turned to politics” for relief10. In the telephone sector, AT&T’s Bell System enjoyed a patent-based monopoly until 1894; once those patents expired, thousands of new independent telephone companies sprang up (over 22,000 by 1907), usually charging lower rates than Bell11. Bell’s response was not only aggressive litigation but also lobbying – it eventually embraced government regulation as a means to shield its monopoly when it couldn’t quash competition outright1213. Likewise, in meatpacking, banking, and other sectors, dominant firms facing eroding market power helped drive “reforms” to tighten government oversight in ways that favored industry leaders1415. As one historical survey concluded, by the early 20th century “almost unanimously, [big business] turned to the power of the state to get what it could not get by voluntary means.” Corporate leaders coordinated through groups like the National Civic Federation to promote a “business-government partnership” – a conscious alliance aimed at managing competition and heading off both radical labor and free-market forces1617. In short, the myth that heroic regulators kept Gilded Age monopolists in check is inverted: often the monopolists themselves welcomed and shaped regulation to protect their dominance18.

Finance: “Too Big to Fail” Bailouts and Regulatory Capture

In modern finance, the pattern of government buttressing incumbent giants is evident in crises and regulation alike. Large financial institutions enjoy an implicit promise of state support – the “too big to fail” doctrine – that amounts to a tremendous competitive advantage. During the 2008 financial meltdown, U.S. authorities orchestrated rescues and mergers for behemoths like Bear Stearns, AIG, Citigroup, Bank of America, etc., while many smaller banks were allowed to fail or be absorbed. A comprehensive historical study confirms that in banking crises, the biggest banks consistently come out on top: “a country’s largest banks (the top-5 by assets) typically gain market share in crises, as small banks fail more often or are absorbed, making the largest banks even more dominant after crises.” This occurs even though the largest banks usually took greater risks and suffered larger losses in the downturn; their survival and expansion are assured by “substantially higher rates of government rescues” for those institutions1920. In short, public policy often cushions the fall of financial giants and lets them emerge with an even tighter grip on the market.

Even outside of crisis episodes, the implicit government backstop for big banks distorts the playing field. The International Monetary Fund reported that major banks designated “systemically important” (so-called SIFIs) benefit from an “implicit public subsidy” due to creditors’ expectations of government bailouts. This safety net allows these firms to borrow at lower interest rates than smaller rivals, which “distorts competition among banks” and encourages excessive risk-taking21. In 2012, the IMF estimated the funding advantage of “too important to fail” institutions was worth tens of billions of dollars per year in the U.S. alone2223. The result is a classic moral hazard: big banks reap outsized profits underwritten by taxpayer-provided insurance, while leaner competitors lack such support.

Ironically, post-crisis regulatory reforms have also tended to entrench the largest financial incumbents. The Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, aimed at reining in Wall Street, imposed complex compliance burdens that big banks could manage (with their armies of lawyers and lobbyists) but which disproportionately hurt community banks. By one account, over 90% of small banks reported a significant rise in compliance costs due to Dodd-Frank, forcing many to cut back services like mortgages2425. A 2013 survey found more than a quarter of small banks were considering mergers or acquisitions simply to survive the new regulatory costs, portending further consolidation of banking into fewer, larger institutions26. In other words, regulations ostensibly targeting “too big to fail” banks ended up raising barriers to entry and expansion for the “too small to succeed”. The net effect in the decade after the 2008 crisis was a wave of bank mergers and exits that left a more concentrated industry. By 2020, the top five U.S. banks held a significantly higher share of total bank assets than before the crisis, while the number of local banks continued to shrink1920. Through bailouts and burdensome rules, the state has effectively shielded banking oligopolies, reinforcing the dominance of financial leviathans at the expense of smaller lenders and overall market competition.

Big Tech: Regulation and the Incumbent Advantage

In the technology sector, a similar dynamic plays out as entrenched tech giants often turn government policy into a moat against upstart competitors. It is sometimes assumed that fast-moving tech industries thrive despite government, not because of it – yet big tech firms frequently leverage the state to cement their market power. As venture capital firm Andreessen Horowitz observes, “Incumbents often have another enormous advantage – the ability to wire the government against startup competitors.” Successful tech companies that began as disruptive startups tend, once powerful, to “inject themselves into the political system and seek regulatory capture – a wall of laws and regulations that protect and entrench their positions, and that new startups cannot possibly scale.” The historical result of this cycle, repeated in industry after industry, “has been government-enforced monopolies and cartels.”2728 In other words, dominant firms often welcome regulation that raises compliance costs or other hurdles, knowing that smaller entrants will be unable to bear them.

Concrete examples are increasingly visible. Privacy regulations provide one case: sweeping rules like the EU’s GDPR and various U.S. state data laws ostensibly constrain tech giants’ data practices, but they also impose enormous compliance costs that only the largest firms can easily afford. A Stanford policy analysis notes that “privacy regulation can be costly to firms, particularly smaller ones, and may benefit incumbent firms.” While such rules have curbed certain undesirable practices (like pervasive tracking), they also “hurt marketing efforts, making it harder for consumers to find products… and hurting company profits,” which a big firm can weather far better than a small startup29. Indeed, after GDPR’s implementation, the market share of Google and Facebook in online advertising actually rose in Europe – partly because many smaller ad tech competitors could not cope with the new compliance burdens, leading advertisers to consolidate spending with the giants. This illustrates the broader point: well-intentioned regulations often unintentionally fortify the market leaders who have the legal teams and cash buffers to navigate them.

Big Tech firms also exploit direct government partnerships to their advantage. Major technology companies routinely secure lucrative government contracts (for cloud computing, AI, defense projects, etc.) that give them revenue streams and validation which startups lack. For instance, Amazon, Microsoft, and Google have won multi-billion dollar federal cloud service deals, while newer entrants struggle to break into that public-sector market. In areas like facial recognition or artificial intelligence, large incumbents collaborate with government agencies to set standards that can end up favoring their platforms and locking in their dominance. Moreover, when regulators do turn a scrutinizing eye toward Big Tech, the established players often lobby for complex rules that they can comply with, but which burden smaller rivals. This phenomenon was seen in social media content regulations and proposed online safety laws – Facebook’s CEO publicly called for more regulation in areas like harmful content and political advertising, a move widely interpreted as an attempt to shape rules in a way that Facebook could handle but a fledgling competitor could not. In short, the tech sector is not a laissez-faire exception to state favoritism; rather, it showcases modern forms of regulatory capture and alliance-building between Silicon Valley and Washington.

Defense Industry: The Military-Industrial Cartel

Perhaps nowhere is the symbiotic relationship between government and big business more institutionalized than in the defense industry. The phrase “military-industrial complex,” coined by President Eisenhower in 1961, acknowledged the tight nexus of the Pentagon and defense contractors. Decades later, that nexus has only grown more entrenched, often to the detriment of competition and innovation in the sector. Defense is a unique market – the government is essentially the only buyer (a monopsony), and for national security reasons it cannot allow too many failures among its suppliers. This has led to repeated waves of government-encouraged consolidation and generous support for top contractors. After the Cold War, for example, Pentagon officials explicitly urged major military suppliers to merge (“consolidate or disappear” was the famous 1993 “Last Supper” directive30), resulting in the shrinkage of 50+ firms into a handful of “prime” contractors. By the early 2000s, five giant companies – Lockheed Martin, Boeing, Northrop Grumman, Raytheon, and General Dynamics – dominated the U.S. defense landscape, each entrenched in its niche (air, naval, space, missiles, etc.)31. This cozy club enjoyed stable funding and often preferential treatment, while smaller would-be entrants found it nearly impossible to win major contracts.

Despite official policies in recent years aiming to foster smaller defense startups, in practice the Defense Department continues to reinforce incumbent advantages. A 2025 analysis observes that while the Pentagon claims to make room for small businesses, “in practice it’s reinforcing a new class of giants and propping up legacy companies.” The military’s appetite for big mergers “remains as strong as ever, leaving small businesses on the menu, not at the table.”32 Modern “defense tech” firms like Palantir or Anduril began as insurgent disruptors, but as they have grown, they too are following “remarkably similar consolidation playbooks” to the old defense primes3334. The result is “not the diverse, resilient industrial base needed for future challenges, but rather a new revolving triangle of influence connecting Pentagon leadership, technology-focused contractors, and venture capital firms.”35 In other words, a tight insider network is capturing the defense procurement process.

Large defense contractors also routinely devour smaller innovators before they can fully challenge the status quo. Palantir executive Shyam Sankar has described a “first breakfast” phenomenon in which established defense companies “habitually devour smaller innovative companies… or exploit incumbent advantages, effectively stifling true innovation.”36 Once a startup demonstrates a promising new technology (drones, AI, cybersecurity, etc.), a prime contractor may quickly acquire it – ensuring that the new tech is folded into the incumbent’s empire rather than emerging as an independent competitor. Government acquisition rules often favor firms with extensive past performance and scale, which by definition favors the incumbents. Even when newer firms win contracts, they face bureaucratic hurdles and requirements (security clearances, compliance audits, lobbying expertise) that tilt the field toward the experienced giants. Moreover, the defense sector has seen direct bailouts that protect big players: for example, Congress provided a massive loan guarantee to Lockheed in 1971 when the company was near bankruptcy, on the grounds of preserving an essential defense supplier. The COVID-19 pandemic again saw Pentagon and Congress funnel emergency funds to big contractors to “maintain readiness.” All these measures underscore that the government often acts to preserve the dominance of key defense firms, treating them as too important to fail or too integral to lose – even if that means smothering the competition that could spur cost savings or innovation.

Agriculture provides another vivid example of state intervention aiding the biggest market players under the guise of public interest. For decades, U.S. farm policies – from commodity subsidies to crop insurance and trade protections – have disproportionately benefited large agribusinesses at the expense of small family farms. Although farm subsidy programs were originally sold as lifelines for struggling “small farmers,” in practice the vast majority of subsidy dollars flow to the largest (and wealthiest) producers. According to one extensive analysis, from 1995 to 2021 “the top 10% of farm subsidy recipients received 78% of all subsidies, while the bottom 80% received only 9%.” Because payments are often tied to acreage or output, “these subsidies… favor larger farms over smaller ones.” The predictable outcome has been rapid consolidation: the number of small and mid-sized farms has steadily declined since the 1980s, while the number of giant industrial farms (and average farm size) has swelled dramatically37. In short, federal intervention has helped “the big get bigger,” squeezing out smallholders who can’t compete with the economies of scale and government support enjoyed by agro-conglomerates.

Contemporary policy continues to reflect this skewed dynamic. As the Environmental Working Group notes, “Farm subsidies already favor the largest and wealthiest farms… [new legislation] will further tilt the playing field against small family farmers.”38 Recent budget bills have proposed increasing payment limits and loosening eligibility rules in ways that make it even easier for large farming operations to collect multiple overlapping subsidies, while cutting other supports like food assistance. The beneficiaries are often concentrated in certain commodities (corn, soy, cotton, rice, dairy, etc.) dominated by big agribusiness interests, who employ lobbyists to keep the subsidy spigots open. For example, federal sugar price support programs (including import quotas) prop up a handful of domestic sugar producers, guaranteeing them high prices and shielding them from foreign competition – effectively a state-granted oligopoly that raises costs for consumers but locks in profits for incumbent firms. Similarly, strict agricultural marketing orders and licensing rules (for milk, almonds, citrus, etc.) often date back to New Deal-era regulations and still give producer cartels the power to limit market entry and set prices. These mechanisms, backed by government authority, mainly serve the larger producers who dominate the marketing boards, disadvantaging smaller farmers who have less say.

The overall pattern in agriculture is clear: the state’s heavy hand in the market tends to solidify the dominance of large agribusiness players. Subsidies, once introduced, become capitalized into land values and business models – benefiting those who own the most land (i.e. big producers) and raising barriers for new or smaller entrants who can’t afford skyrocketing land costs without comparable subsidy income. Meanwhile, smaller farms often find themselves dependent on whatever crumbs of aid they can get, which can trap them in low-margin commodity production rather than higher-value niches. As in other sectors, the ostensible public purpose of these interventions (food security, stable prices, etc.) often masks a reality of industry capture, where policies are tailored to what the powerful farm lobbies want. The end result has been fewer, larger firms controlling more of the market – exactly the sort of outcome one would expect if government and incumbent businesses are allied more than they are adversaries.

Across these examples, certain recurring mechanisms emerge by which government actions protect incumbents and hinder competition:

  • Regulatory Capture: Industries frequently co-opt the regulators meant to oversee them. Whether through lobbying influence, revolving-door hires, or sheer information advantage, large firms help shape regulations in their favor. The concept of regulatory capture was illustrated by the railroads’ influence over the ICC, and it remains alive today whenever, for instance, big tech companies help draft complex privacy or security rules that they can absorb but that stymie startups. As Andreessen Horowitz put it, once dominant, companies “seek… a wall of laws and regulations that protect and entrench their positions”39. The result is cartel-like market structures enforced by government, rather than by secret collusion alone.

  • Subsidies and Bailouts: Direct financial support from government – be it subsidies, tax breaks, or emergency bailouts – overwhelmingly favors established players. These firms have the resources to apply for and secure subsidies (or to be deemed “essential” in crises), whereas smaller competitors often do not. The expectation of bailouts (e.g. for big banks or airlines) also gives incumbents a lower cost of capital, acting as an implicit subsidy that distorts competition21.

  • Licensing and Permits: Occupational licensing and permitting regimes are often weaponized by incumbents to raise barriers against new entrants. Even the U.S. federal government has acknowledged this: “Occupational licensing is but one example of a type of state law that may favor incumbents at the expense of new competitors.” Other examples include “certificate of need” laws that make it hard for new hospitals to open (protecting existing hospitals), state franchise laws that block direct-to-consumer sales (protecting auto dealerships), and taxi medallion systems that strictly limited the number of cabs (protecting incumbent taxi companies).4041 In each case, the ostensible rationale (consumer safety, avoiding oversupply, etc.) serves to cloak an anti-competitive barrier. Established businesses often lobby for such licensing rules or quotas explicitly to keep out nimble rivals – a practice that dates back to guild privileges and government-chartered monopolies of earlier eras.

  • Legal and Procurement Preferences: Governments may also enact rules that, intentionally or not, favor large incumbents through sheer scale. For example, procurement criteria requiring extensive past performance, large balance sheets, or costly certifications will naturally exclude most small firms – a common scenario in defense and infrastructure contracting. Incumbents likewise exploit intellectual property and patent laws to prolong monopolies (e.g. by lobbying for patent term extensions or regulatory exclusivities), using state-granted legal privileges to block generic or new competitors. Trade tariffs and import quotas, meanwhile, often protect domestic oligopolies (such as the small number of U.S. sugar producers or steelmakers) under the banner of national interest. All of these tools ensure that the competitive field tilts toward the existing dominant firms.

Conclusion: The “Myth” of Adversarial State vs. Corporate Power

From the railroad tycoons of the 19th century to the tech and finance barons of the 21st, the evidence is overwhelming that government intervention and big-business interests have frequently worked hand-in-glove. The popular narrative of public officials valiantly checking corporate power while corporations uniformly resist government “meddling” is, in many cases, a myth. More often, corporate giants seek out and thrive under special treatment, and policymakers oblige – whether due to ideological alignment, lobbying influence, or a genuine (if misguided) belief that pro-incumbent policies serve the public. The outcome is a form of corporatism or “crony capitalism,” in which state power is used to fortify monopolistic structures instead of dismantling them.

Historically, far from being laissez-faire villains subdued by reform, many “robber barons” invited regulation to stabilize their empires642. Today, whether it’s “too big to fail” banks, Big Tech platforms, defense contractors, or agribusiness conglomerates, the largest firms often operate with an implicit alliance with governments – receiving bailouts or preferential rules that smaller competitors cannot leverage. This protective alliance can lead to stagnation and reduced innovation, as competition is muzzled. As one Silicon Valley essay warned, “When big companies can weaponize the government to crush [startups], the result is stagnation and then decline.”43 The true “checks and balances” at play are not so much government versus corporate power, but rather incumbent firms and government acting as reciprocal checks on upstart competition.

Of course, not every regulation or subsidy is conceived with cynical intent – many arise from valid public aims. However, the pattern of incumbents benefiting disproportionately is too consistent to ignore. It calls for a more clear-eyed view of the state–corporate relationship: one that recognizes how often the rules of the game are designed (or at least shaped) by the biggest players to keep themselves on top. Understanding this reality is the first step in addressing it. Otherwise, policies billed as reining in corporate power will continue, paradoxically, to entrench it – and the cycle of government-backed monopoly power will persist, to the detriment of competition, consumers, and the broader economy.

Sources

  • Roy A. Childs, “Big Business and the Rise of American Statism” (1971)5447421.
  • Gabriel Kolko, Railroads and Regulation, 1877–1916 (1965), as cited in Childs6.
  • Matthew Baron et al., “Survival of the Biggest: Large Banks and Financial Crises” (FDIC Working Paper, 2023)1920.
  • International Monetary Fund, Global Financial Stability Report (April 2014), and IMF Survey summary “Big Banks Benefit from Government Subsidies”21.
  • Hester Peirce et al., “How Are Small Banks Faring under Dodd-Frank?” Mercatus Center (2014)26.
  • Andreessen Horowitz (Marc Andreessen), “The Little Tech Agenda” (2023)2728.
  • Stanford SIEPR Policy Brief, “Balancing act: Protecting privacy, protecting competition” (2023)29.
  • Nicholas Hooper, “Another Last Supper and a New Era of Defense Giants,” War on the Rocks (May 5, 2025)323336.
  • Dustin Walker, “Giants and the Myth of America’s New Defense Consolidation,” War on the Rocks (June 4, 2025)3031.
  • Environmental Working Group, “Triple Dipping: Budget bill raises farm subsidies for wealthy farmers” (June 10, 2025)38.
  • Kelly Lester, “Farming Subsidies Disproportionately Hurt Small Farms,” John Locke Foundation (Apr. 27, 2023)37.
  • Council of Economic Advisers Issue Brief, “Benefits of Competition and Indicators of Market Power” (April 2016)4041.

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